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Centralization in Education: Why 
Johnny Can't Spell Bureaucracy 
SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION 
OF EDUCATION. Edited by David L. Kirpt & Donald N. Jensen.tt 
Philadelphia and London: The Falmer Press. 1986. Pp. vi, 389. 
Reviewed by Neal Devinst 
In the thirty years since Brown v. Board of Education, 1 control of the 
public education system has shifted away from local school boards 
toward more centralized administration, at both the federal and state 
levels. This process, known as centralization, includes regulation and 
legalization of education. Inspired by concerns over equality of opportu-
nity, school finance, and educational content, this transformation has 
affected education in both positive and negative ways. While the recogni-
tion that langnage, race, alienage, and physical disability should not serve 
as absolute limits to public education is of great positive value, the result-
ing bureaucratization of education can impair the ability of schools to 
respond to student needs. Determining where to draw the line between 
appropriate and inappropriate centralization is, of course, the issue and 
the problem. 
Recent events suggest that Congress, the President, and the courts 
have erratic and often inconsistent views on centralization. In response 
to widespread dissatisfaction regarding overcentralization in education, 2 
the Reagan administration proposed and Congress enacted legislation 
t Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. 
tt Research Associate, Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, 
Stanford University School of Education. 
t Assistant Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A. 1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, 
Vanderbilt Law School. I would like to extend special thanks to Shelley Barber, Jim Stedman, and 
Ginger Williams for their helpful comments on earlier manuscripts. 
I. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
2. The Reagan administration characterized such programs as "burdensome, inflexible, 
unresponsive, and duplicative." OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, WHITE HOUSE, AMERICA'S 
NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR EcONOMIC RECOVERY 7-1 (1981). This criticism is supported 
by many who feel that federal dollars, constituting only 8.6% of all public school expenditures in 
1981-82, have been used excessively to direet and control local education. NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1982, at 21, table 14 (1982). 
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that grants states and localities greater freedom to determine how to 
spend federal educational funds. 3 In contrast, both the President and 
Congress endorsed-as a by-product of the current Excellence in Educa-
tion movement4-a return to the type of programs that characterized 
earlier federal reform efforts, with objectives and methods established in 
Washington.5 Judicial practices appear equally contradictory; for exam-
ple, while the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution's due pro-
cess clause as guaranteeing students a hearing before suspension or 
expulsion, the Court has not imposed procedural safeguards for corporal 
punishment. 6 
Scholars have also offered conflicting opinions on the appropriate 
role of centralization in education. 7 Some argue that local systems can-
not be trusted either to provide adequate educational resources or to 
ensure equality of educational opportunity. 8 Others claim that centrali-
zation, rather than accomplishing its stated goals, saps needed vitality 
from the educational enterprise. 9 One set of responses to this contro-
versy is found in School Days, Rule Days, a recent collection of essays 
edited by David Kirp and Donald Jensen. 10 Most of these essays are crit-
ical of centralization. School Days is thus most useful in understanding 
the pitfalls of centralization efforts. At this level, School Days accom-
plishes its objectives in admirable style. The authors are thoughtful and 
thorough in evaluating the possible problems with centralization, espe-
3. Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, §§ 552-596, U.S.C. §§ 3801-3876 
(1982). For an overview discussion of this legislation, see Devins & Stedman, New Federalism in 
Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1243, 
1254-57 (1984). 
4. For an overview discussion of recent education reform proposals, see Stedman & Jordan, 
Education Reform Reports: Content and Impact, Cong. Res. Service, (EPW) No. 86-56 (Mar. 17, 
1986) (on file with author). 
5. See, e.g., Excellence in Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 4031-37 (West Supp. 1986). 
6. Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process required before suspension or 
expulsion) with Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (no hearing or notice required prior to 
imposition of corporal punishment). 
7. See generally Rethinking the Federal Role in Education, 52 HARV. EDuc. REV. 371 (1982) 
(symposium airing debate on the appropriate role of federal government in education); The Impact 
of Federal Funding: Lessons Leamed, 15 EDUC. & URB. Soc'Y 267 (1983) (review and commentary 
on experience with a federal role in education). 
8. See, e.g., NATIONAL GOVERNORS' Ass'N, TIME FOR RESULTS: THE GOVERNORS' 1991 
REPORT ON EDUCATION (1986) (statewide efforts necessary to ensure educational preferences); 
Doyle & Finn, American Schools and the Future of Local Control, 77 PUB. INTEREST 77, 80-85 (Fall 
1984) (state control needed to insure attainment of acceptable educational standards). 
9. See, e.g., D. KlRP, JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION (1982) (sensitivity to local politics, not national standards, is key to effective school 
desegregation); Kirst, The Changing Balance in State and Local Power to Colltrol Education, 66 PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN 189 (1984) (commentary on the increased state control and diminished federal and 
local control of education). 
10. SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF EDUCATION (D. 
Kirp & D. Jensen eds. 1986) [hereinafter ScHOOL DAYS]. 
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cially where pedagogical and civil rights objectives are threatened by pro-
grams that invite abuse and inefficiency rather than reform. 
These assessments, for the most part, look narrowly at the imple-
mentation of various programs and do not question the values that 
underlie centralization. Consequently, although many of the essays high-
light defects in centralization, the authors might actually prefer a modi-
fied version of the program at issue rather than no program at all. 
Indeed, as Kirp states in the book's introduction, "Except to the ideo-
logue or the willful oversimplifier, the choice between more or fewer 
rules, more or less law, is necessarily a matter of degree" (p. 12).11 
School Days, Rule Days, however, is incomplete. Despite the accu-
rate descriptions of centralization's extremes, 12 the book pays insufficient 
attention to instances where centralization does work13 or where the 
costs of regulation are outweighed by some fundamental social objec-
tive. 14 Moreover, School Days, rarely recognizes that centralization often 
reflects public attitudes and beliefs. 15 For these reasons, Kirp and 
Jensen's work only fully satisfies one of the two objectives necessarily 
involved in works on this subject; an understanding of the risks of 
centralization. 
This Review argues that an exploration of the rationale behind cen-
tralization and a discussion of instances where centralization proves 
effective is an equally important objective. I examine School Days, Rule 
Days's arguments that educational progress is impeded by deficiencies in 
the present scheme, including: the failure of the judicial system to recog-
nize conflicts within minority communities; the disruptive effect of due 
process proceedings on creative teaching and the equitable distribution of 
school resources; and the reliance on regulations that prove ineffective 
because they are either unreasonably burdensome or their sanctions are 
too severe. I conclude that, while these analyses raise significant ques-
tions, thoughtful reform cannot occur without some understanding of the 
values underlying regulation and the possible effectiveness of centraliza-
tion. My goal is to demonstrate the value of including such materials in 
works on this subject. 
Part I of this Review introduces the scope of centralization in educa-
11. Kirp further suggests that most of the authors "recognize that regnlation may sometimes 
be a good and needed thing . . . ; that the present regulatory regime may be preferable to the 
politically likely alternatives; and that ... a course reform is sounder than policy abdication at the 
national level." Kirp, Introduction: The Fourth R: Reading, Writing, 'Rithmetic-and Rules, in 
SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 1, 13. I disagree. For the most part, these essays do not offer 
constmctive suggestions for the reform of the program at issue. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra notes 41-61 and aecompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 62-73 and aecompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 74-87 and aecompanying text. 
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tion. This discussion concludes that although regulation and legalization 
envelop much of our educational system, courts, legislators, and adminis-
trators frequently shun opportunities to expand their power over local 
educational authority. Consequently, despite clear cases of regulatory 
excess, courts and legislators are cognizant of the risks of centralization. 
Furthermore, this discussion reveals that centralization efforts often con-
form with national policy concerns; therefore, to understand the proper 
reach of centralization, one must attend to the appropriate role of public 
opinion. 
Part II assesses the costs of centralization as described in School 
Days. I pay special attention to those essays concerning legalism in edu-
cation. This Part reveals that School Days limits itself to a consideration 
of problems that may develop when a local school system must comply 
with the dictates of some central authority. The authors rarely consider 
the prospect that these costs may be outweighed by the social good 
achieved via centralization. Moreover, no essay in School Days is princi-
pally concerned with a centralization program that has accomplished its 
objectives. 
Part III is a critique of the Kirp-Jensen collection. I place great 
emphasis on the book's failure to consider the impetus behind the cen-
tralization programs it evaluates. Through the use of case studies, this 
critique demonstrates that centralization is both a result of balancing 
social good against social cost and a reflection of public opinion. I argue 
that since education is a public good, it is appropriate that centralization 
reflect public opinion. Finally, I note instances where centralization pro-
grams have proved effective. 
I 
THE DIMENSIONS OF CENTRALIZATION 
Centralization comes from many sources, involving all branches of 
federal and state government. The remarkable degree to which each of 
these sources contributes to educational policy elucidates the pervasive-
ness of centralization in education. 
Court involvement in educational policy is legion. 16 Since Brown, 
courts have been the receptacles of efforts to seek equality in education. 
Statistics bear this out: from 1946-56, 112 federal court decisions con-
16. David Tyack, in his historical review of court challenges to education practices, discovered 
that while courts have always played some role in education policy matters, judicial involvement hns 
grown exponentially both in terms of the number of cases and the significance of such cases. Tynck, 
Toward a Social History of Law and Public Education, in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, nt 212-37. 
He notes that even in the period prior to Brown, where going to court was a "last resort," parents 
went to court "[w]hen dominant cultural groups used laws to enforce their values on others" nnd 
"when professional educators used state school codes to enforce their version of the one best 
system." Id. at 214. 
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cemed equality in education; from 1956-66, 729 decisions; and from 
1966-76, 1273 decisions (p. 229). Not surprisingly, constitutional rulings 
made by federal courts have dramatically influenced the structure of con-
temporary education. These rulings, aside from insisting that the Brown 
mandate be enforced, 17 have demanded that students receive a due pro-
cess hearing prior to suspension, 18 that students have meaningful first 
amendment rights, 19 that religion not be "established" in the public edu-
cational system, 20 and that all students have access to the public educa-
tional system.21 Statutory rulings made by federal courts likewise have 
been influential in defining the reach and applicability of antidiscrimina-
tion laws. 22 
State courts have also become increasingly involved in reviewing the 
policies and practices of school boards and state education departments. 
Donald Jensen and Thomas Griffin's study of the legalization of educa-
tional policymaking in California (pp. 325-42) discovered changes in 
both the use and reach of state court decisions analogous to the post-
Brown litigation explosion in federal courts. These decisions, like federal 
lawsuits, increasingly .involve individual liberties and civil rights (p. 331). 
Moreover, many state courts have read into their constitutions a right for 
children in one district to receive like resources as children in another. 23 
Despite the significant role played by the judiciary, administrative 
rulemaking and legislative mandates remain the primary source of cen-
tralization in education. Eugene Bardach, in his essay "Educational 
Paperwork" (pp. 124-44), reveals the awe-inspiring dimensions of state 
and federal regulation. According to Bardach: 
In the six-month period between July and December 1981 ... California 
schools and school districts were obliged to submit to the State Depart-
17. See generally the cases discussed in Devins, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: The 
Courts' Abandonment of Brown v. Board of Education, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 7 (1984). 
18. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
19. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker and other student rights 
cases are discussed in Lawrence Friedman, Limited Monarchy: The Rise and Fall of Student Rights, 
in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 238-54. 
20. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer). 
21. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
22. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (colleges that receive federal 
financial assistance must obey statute prohibiting sex discrimination); Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools); 
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (city's employment policies violated 
Civil Rights Act, but no compensatory damages allowed absent evidence of discriminatory intent); 
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (public schools are not required to provide sign 
language interpreter to deaf child in the classroom). 
23. The U.S. Constitution does not recognize such a right. See San Antonio Indep. School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded 
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution."); see also Kirp & Jensen, The New Federalism 
Goes to Court, in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 368, 374. 
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ment of Education seventy-eight different annual reports on one or 
another matter .... Each month during this same period, another five 
reports were due .... Twelve quarterly reports were due .... And, up to 
sixty-nine reports, due 'as required,' could also have been called for .... 
(p. 124). 
Moreover, state regulatory demands are likely to increase as the 
state's share of the education budget grows larger.24 Thirty-five percent 
of the average state budget is directed toward education, and the state 
share of education finance now eclipses the local school district contribu-
tion. 25 This increased contribution, largely inspired by the Excellence in 
Education movement, will likely include "a marked increase in state reg-
u1ation, direct state administration, and elaborate statewide monitoring 
and accountability systems. " 26 
Centralization at the federal level is equally demanding. Federal reg-
ulations governing education occupy approximately 1800 pages in the 
Code of Federal Regulations.27 Moreover, state and local agencies spend 
1.2 million hours per year filling out federal forms and reports (p. 124). 
While centralization clearly affects the day-to-:day operations of our 
schools, there are real limits on the sweep of such encroachments. 28 
These limits are reflected in recent shifts away from centralization under-
taken by all three branches of the federal government. Furthermore, 
even when the federal government embraces centralization, its embrace 
appears tempered by a recognition of the need to respond to popular 
opinion. 
First, despite the pervasiveness of regulation, courts and lawmakers 
have not accepted all invitations to intervene in the public education sys-
tem. The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to 
equivalent levels of per-pupil spending, 29 that the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act does not guarantee any particular level of 
education, 30 that corporal punishment does not violate the eighth amend-
ment, 31 and that school officials may institute otherwise unconstitutional 
24. Doyle & Finn, supra note 8, at 84-85 (discussing the recent emergence of the "Excellence 
in Education" movement). 
25. Id. at 86. 
26. Id. 
27. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 31-796 (1986). 
28. In addition to those limitations discussed in the balance of this section, the public 
education system is, as a practical matter, an institution resistant to change. For example, Stanford 
education professor Larry Cuban asserts that for the past SO years, the high school has presented n 
picture "striking in its uniformity." Cuban, Persistent Instruction: The High School Classroom. 1900· 
1980, 63 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 113, 116 (1982). Specifically, Cuban notes the "persistence of whole-
group instruction, teacher talk outdistancing student talk, ... and little student movement in 
academic classes." Id. 
29. San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
30. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
31. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
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"search and seizures" to preserve order in the schoolhouse. 32 Indeed, in 
their review of trends in legalization (pp. 369-78), David Kirp and 
Donald Jensen suggest that "[t]he heyday of educational policymaking 
by the courts seems to have run its course ... [A]ttention lias largely 
shifted away from the courts and back to the legislature" (p. 368). 
Nor is an increasingly expansionist federal role in education likely. 
The Reagan administration, for example, lias articulated a "New Feder-
alism in Education," portions of which have been enacted by Congress.33 
William Clune, in his analysis of the federal role in education (pp. 187-
208), writes that the New Federalism is premised on the belief "that one 
cannot legislate learning, one cannot produce change in local education 
with grants or laws from Washington, and one cannot do anything about 
class-linked achievement patterns. Skepticism about the potential for 
government intervention is part of the neo-conservative mindset" (p. 
189). 
The New Federalism's success lias been mixed, suggesting that, 
although the federal role may not be expanding, it is not shrinking. 
While the Reagan administration's civil rights enforcement effort has 
been narrowly focused (at least as compared to the that of the Carter 
administration), 34 and while block grants have replaced some categorical 
grant programs, 35 for the most part, the status quo has been preserved. 
As Chester E. Finn, Jr., now Assistant Secretary for the Department of 
Education, commented in 1983: "All the major programs-elementary, 
secondary, and postsecondary-remain much as they were when Jimmy 
Carter left office in January 1981, and so far as I can tell this situation is 
going to persist for the foreseeable future."36 In fact, the administration 
has been a force behind renewed efforts to direct school officials' conduct 
through its involvement in the Excellence in Education movement, its 
efforts to open up public schools to voluntary religious groups, and its 
proposal to institute antidrug programs in school systems. 37 
The administration's ardent support of such initiatives makes an 
32. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
33. The Reagan administration, in order to decentralize the federal role, has proposed 
elimination of the Department of Education, streamlining government regulation, and reducing the 
education budget. See Doyle & Hartle, Ideology, Pragmatic Politics, and the Education Budget, in 
MAINTAINING THE SAFETY NET: INCOME REDISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS IN THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION 119-53 (J. Weicher ed. 1984). Parts of the New Federalism have been enacted 
into law. See Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, §§ 552-96,20 U.S.C. §§ 3801-
76 (1982). 
34. See, e.g., Devins, Closing the Classroom Door on Civil Rights, 11 HuM. RTS. 26 (Winter 
1984) (review of Reagan Justice Department approach to school desegregation). 
35. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 3, at 1254-57. 
36. Finn, Reflections on "The Disassembly of the Federal Educational Role," 15 Eouc. & URB. 
Soc'v 389, 390 (1983). 
37. See, e.g., Weinraub, Republicans Prod the White House to Move on Drugs, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 8, 1986, at AI, col. 6 (discusses proposal to fight drug use through Department of Education). 
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important, albeit obvious, point: Centralization efforts will be supported 
if they conform with national policy concerns. Nowhere is this clearer 
than with the administration's recent proposal to extend federal funding 
to school districts that offer plans to reduce drug use, contingent on the 
districts' progress in this effort. 38 The administration embraces the 
"effect-based standard" for federal funding in this context, the same type 
of condition that it opposed in the granting of federal funds for school 
desegregation, 39 because the antidrug campaign reflects a fundamental 
nationwide concern. As this proposal demonstrates, whenever universal 
educational concerns are involved, centralization of education becomes a 
more significant administration preference than its New Federalism in 
education. 
II 
THE COST OF CENTRALIZATION: SCHOOL DAY£ RULE 
DAYS DESCRIBED 
Most of the essays in School Days, Rule Days offer critical assess-
ments of centralization in education, focusing on the problems that can 
develop when a local school system is coerced by courts, lawmakers, and 
administrators. This approach reveals that regulation and legalization 
may work serious harm to the pedagogical objectives of schools. 
Paperwork requirements, the provision of educational services to handi-
capped and limited-English students, and court-ordered reform all take a 
heavy toll on very finite resources. Furthermore, the need to stay within 
the letter of the law may limit the creativity and authority of teachers. 
Finally, the judicial inquiry may prove counterproductive because it fails 
adequately to consider nonparty interests or possible political obstacles. 
These concerns are quite serious and provide good reason to ques-
tion the efficacy of regulation and legalization in education. Because 
post-New Deal reform in education inevitably involves some type of cen-
tralization, 40 these words of caution serve an essential function. This 
Part explores in some detail the School Days, Rule Days critique of legal-
38. See H.R. Doc. No. 266, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 25 (message from the President transmitting 
draft of Drug Free America Act of l986),final version of legislation reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3207. 
39. School Desegregation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-31 (1982) (testimony of Thomas I. 
Atkins, General Counsel, NAACP). 
40. New Deal reform efforts are discussed in Fass, Before Legalism: The New Deal and 
American Education, in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 22-44. Fass notes that many of these 
programs were effective because "the federal government saw its role as simply providing funds. It 
selected personnel on the basis of relief needs, but left program content to various professional 
groups and state departments of education." /d. at 29. Fass, however, is ultimately critical of New 
Deal reform efforts, claiming that because the New Deal operated as an emergency relief program, 
"it failed to institutionalize its new perceptions about federal obligations for education." I d. at 41. 
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ism. It also provides a summary discussion of those essays that consider 
centralization that is the consequence of legislative directive or adminis-
trative fiat. 
A. Legalism 
Court-ordered educational reform, a subject of frequent scholarly 
criticism,41 is amply attacked in School Days. Doris Fine's essay on 
efforts to reform educational practices through litigation in San Fran-
cisco, "Just Schools" (pp. 302-23), considers the many wrong turns that 
can be made when judges administer school systems.42 Indeed, as Fine 
tells it, effective reform cannot be based on judicial action, for "adjust-
ments to the court's competence entail serious distortions of the educa-
tional issues at stake" (p. 321). This conclusion is based on her review of 
three early-1970's challenges to school board practices; school desegrega-
tion, bilingual education, and the failure of the schools to teach basic 
skills (pp. 306-14). Only in the school desegregation lawsuit, where edu-
cational policy issues were never raised, did the court play an active role. 
In the other two cases the courts pointed to their lack of expertise in 
educational matters and deferred to school administrators (pp. 306-09). 
The school desegregation lawsuit, Johnson v. San Francisco Unified 
School District, 43 proved a debacle because of school board mismanage-
ment, community opposition to court-ordered busing, and limitations of 
the traditional plaintiff-defendant legal model. Part-time school board 
members, pointing to the desegregation issue as justification for their 
intervention in all school administration matters (pp. 303-04), were 
unable to establish a definable agenda. Instead, the school board was 
able to respond only to narrow and often conflicting constituent interests 
(pp. 305-06). Popular opposition to the desegregation plan exacerbated 
these problems. The predominantly white middle class fled the school 
system (p. 302), Chinese interest groups went to court to challenge the 
41. See generally L. GRAGLlA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976) (argues that a constitutional 
requirement of compulsory integration is self-defeating because individuals are legally and 
practically capable of eseaping integration and social forces will lead individuals to escape rather 
than comply); R. WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF Brown (1984) (discusses the failure of desgregation 
orders to achieve integrated public schools because of white flight); E. WOLF, TRIAL AND ERROR 
(1981) (chronicles the history of recent efforts to desegregate Detroit public schools and criticizes 
judicial decision to require integregation rather than to forbid segregation). But see P. DIMOND, 
BEYOND BusiNG (1985) (reviews legal challenges to school desegregation and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding busing and integration); M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL 
PoLJCYMAKING AND THE COURTS (1982) (review of 65 education reform lawsuits; argues that 
courts could accommodate these social policy controversies only by adopting a political role 
inconsistent with the seperation of powers). 
42. See also D. KIRP, supra note 9; Devins, Integration and Local Politics, 73 PuB. INTEREST 
175 (Fall 1983) (reviewing Kirp). 
43. 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971), vacated and remanded, 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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desegregation plan (pp. 312-13), and the black community was itself 
divided on the desegregation issue (pp. 311-12). On top of this, Fine 
notes that the quality of the judicial inquiry was substantially hampered 
because "the court's own predilections on matters of both procedural and 
substantive law drastically ... curtail[ed] the court's factual and legal 
enquiries" (p. 314). Specifically, the court, by listening only to NAACP 
counsel for plaintiffs and school board counsel for defendants, did not 
consider either the diversity of interests affected by its order or political 
obstacles to the implementation of its desegregation plan (pp. 310-14). 
The consequence of this short-sighted approach was an increase in the 
number of racially unbalanced schools (p. 310). In the end, the district 
court order "never gained more than formal and shallow administrative 
compliance, and was eventually abandoned" (p. 309).44 
Ironically, the questions raised by the bilingualism and quality of 
education litigation received substantial attention following the dismissal 
of those lawsuits (p. 309). Fine suggests that public concern over these 
issues made such reform efforts possible. She therefore concludes that 
"[s]chool capacities and commitments, not court orders, are the decisive 
factors in [educational reform]" (p. 321). This is an important point that 
is borne out in numerous school desegregation cases. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg, for example, has been quite successful in implementing a 
mandatory busing plan because of support from pupils, parents, and city 
leaders. 45 At the other extreme, fierce public opposition to busing has 
left Boston and its public schools more racially divided today than fifteen 
years ago.46 Fine, while recognizing that community support might 
make court-ordered reform effective, does not consider whether certain 
types of reform can only be initiated in the courts or whether certain 
types of social wrongs must be remedied irrespective of possible commu-
nity opposition. Instead, she limits her examination to the problems 
underlying San Francisco's failed desegregation effort. 
The root cause of the limitations of the judicial inquiry identified in 
Fine's essay is given extensive treatment in Deborah Rhode's essay, 
"Conflicts of Interest in Educational Reform Litigation" (pp. 278-300). 
Rhode highlights the failure of the traditional legal model when volatile 
social issues, involving divergent interests, are at stake.47 Noting the pre-
dominance of class actions in educational reform cases, Rhode argues 
44. In place of these education reform efforts, the school board is now confronted with the 
problems associated with declining student enrollments and reduced revenues, such as school closing 
and teacher layoffs. Fine, Just Schools, in ScHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 302-23. 
45. Daniels, In Defense of Busing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, (Magazine), at 34. 
46. Higgins, Boston's Busing Disaster, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 28, 1983, at 16. 
47. See also Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Illterests in Scltool 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (discussing failure of traditional civil rights 
groups to represent divergent interests among the black community). 
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that procedures must be developed that enable courts to consider ade-
quately all affected interests. Her point of departure is the inadequacy of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to cope with actual or potential 
conflicts among class members. While acknowledging that Ru1e 23 
requires the representative party to "fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class,"48 Rhode notes that this requirement may be 
honored more in the breach than in the observation. 
First, named plaintiffs are often concerned with their own interests 
and not those of fellow class members (p. 283). Second, dissenting class 
members may not have a sufficient stake in the matter to justify interven-
tion (p. 286). If dissenting factions do intervene, the case may become 
unmanageable, as there may be too many voices representing too many 
interests (p. 289). Third, federal ru1es ensuring that class members be 
given both notice and an opportunity to comment on pretrial settlement 
have proven ineffective (pp. 290-93). Class members are often not given 
sufficient information to make an informed judgment; vocal class mem-
ber's interests are given disproportionate weight. Fourth, because many 
reform suits are brought by public interest organizations, plaintiffs' attor-
neys, rather than pursuing their clients' best interests, are often advanc-
ing their organizations' ideological agendas (p. 285). For example, 
plaintiffs' attorneys may oppose low visibility settlements that neither 
provide name recognition to their organization nor serve as a meaningful 
precedent in future litigation. Fifth, courts are poor policers of this pro-
cess (pp. 285-87). The problems of adequacy of class representation, 
absent some filing from dissenting class members, is not readily apparent. 
Moreover, courts are unwilling to play an active role in certification deci-
sions because of pressure to clear their dockets. 
Rhode's concerns certainly extend beyond educational policy reform 
to all institutional reform cases. Yet, these issues are particularly acute 
in educational reform. School desegregation litigation in Boston, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco was--or shou1d have been--com-
plicated by a divergence of interests among minority groups and attor-
neys representing their interests in court. 49 In Chicago, for example, the 
NAACP was not allowed to intervene in a school desegregation lawsuit 
initiated by the Justice Department.50 Although the Justice Depart-
ment's support of voluntary desegregation techniques clearly differed 
from the NAACP's views, the court reasoned that the United States 
shou1d be presumed to adequately and fu1ly represent the "public inter-
48. FED. R. CJV. P. 23(a). 
49. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 47; Fine, supra note 44, at 311-13; Yeazell, Intervention and the 
Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REv. 244 (1977). 
50. United States v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1981), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1116 (1985). 
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est."51 Plaintiff interests have also been divided in litigation concerning 
schools for the retarded or the handicapped. Some families seek 
improvements in existing facilities, while others push for the creation of 
community-care alternatives (pp. 279-80). 
Rhode makes several suggestions on how to address these problems. 
She speaks generally of the need to increase judicial awareness of class 
schisms and the need to improve the courts' responses to such conflicts 
(p. 294). She also offers several specific recommendations: requiring 
courts to make a factual record concerning notice and representation; 
requiring class counsel to submit records of consultations with class 
members; including any evidence of class dissension; and asking for less 
stringent requirements for intervention. 
At the same time, Rhode recognizes that such heightened concern 
might not yield better results (p. 296), thereby conceding the legitimacy 
of concerns about "the institutional competence and accountability of 
courts in superintending educational policy" (p. 278). Unlike Fine, how-
ever, Rhode does not view such litigation as necessarily counterproduc-
tive. Toward the end of her essay she argues: 
Though neither courts, counsel, nor parties will always be inclined or 
able to protect class interests, we have no reason to expect legislators or 
bureaucrats to do better .... While we cannot depend on disinterested 
and informed judgment by any single groups of institutional participants, 
we can create sufficient procedural checks and balances to prevent at 
least the worst abuses (p. 297). 
Special interest group representation is also discussed in Donald 
Jensen and Thomas Griffin's study of legalism in California, ''The Legali-
zation of State Educational Policymaking in California" (pp. 325-42). 
Rather than consider, as Rhode does, the problems of possible conflict 
between litigant and class members, Jensen and Griffin point to another 
risk of such court-initiated educational reform, namely, special interest 
groups capturing a state education department. 
Their study reveals that, in California at least, private organizational 
plaintiffs are well suited to advance their ideological objectives before the 
courts, while the state is ill suited to defend their educational policy pri-
orities in a cohesive manner. Organizational plaintiffs, such as the 
NAACP and ACLU, have substantial experience and well-defined objec-
tives (pp. 331-32). This experience is borne out in several ways: attor-
neys have substantial expertise both at trial and the negotiating table; 
plaintiffs are carefully selected; and proven expert witnesses have already 
been identified. In stark contrast, the state generally has little experience 
in school desegregation, school finance, and other matters likely to be 
51. Id. at 686. 
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challenged by organizational plaintiffs (p. 336). 52 In California, this 
problem is aggravated since these lawsuits are defended by the Attorney 
General's office, not the Department of Education. These attorneys, who 
represent the state on a wide variety of issues, are unable "to link legal 
tactics to general educational goals" (p. 338). Instead, these lawyers, 
unfamiliar with state educational policy, have substantial discretion to 
define legal positions that impact substantially on state educational 
policy. 
Noting the steady increase in educational reform cases instituted by 
organizational plaintiffs and the problems inherent in adequately defend-
ing these lawsuits, Jensen and Griffin suggest that state control over its 
educational policy decisions is at risk (p. 341). This presumably is bad, 
for they call for "a reexamination of the way a state defends its interests 
in court" (p. 341). Jensen and Griffin's concern that such poor legal rep-
resentation is deleterious to the state's educational policy, moreover, 
implies that, in their view, organizational plaintiffs are a threat to state 
pedagogical objectives. 
Since state representation in California appears poorly organized, 
Jensen and Griffin's recommendation that the state link legal objectives 
to its pedagogical goals is sensible. Jensen and Griffin, however, fail to 
discuss the outcomes of these cases and the possible role that organiza-
tional plaintiffs play in ensuring the constitutional rights of California 
youngsters. It is therefore impossible to assess whether legalism is ulti-
mately harmful or beneficial. All we learn is that the state's legal repre-
sentation is ineffective. 
The greatest condemnation of legalism in School Days, Rule Days 
concerns not court-ordered reform, but the Education for All Handi-
capped Act, a statute modeled after due process norms. As developed in 
the courts, these norms include written notice of changes in educational 
status, and due process hearings that afford the complainant a right to 
call and cross-examine witnesses as well as revise educational records 
(p. 347). "The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The Case of Special 
Education," written by David Neal and David K.irp (pp. 343-65), argues 
against "placing primary reliance on due process to effect policy change 
52. Statewide statistics, at first glance, do not support this contention. For example, in 
California, the ACLU had only one litigation case and the NAACP three, as compared to the state, 
which defended numerous cases. Jensen & Griffin, The Legalization of State Educational 
Policymaking in California, in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 325, 336. Such statistics are 
misleading, however. Organizational plaintiffs, such as the NAACP and ACLU, file hundreds of 
lawsuits each year challenging state and federal practices. Moreover, although the state is often in 
court defending against organizational plaintiffs, it generally has little opportunity to accumulate 
experience in litigating each of the specific types of claims brought by the more sophisticated 
institutional plaintiffs. !d. 
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[in professionally-run bureaucracies]" (p. 354).53 Specifically, the 
authors take issue with Act provisions that grant to parents rights both 
to negotiate with school officials about the type of education their chil-
dren will receive and to appeal the school's decision to a hearing exam-
iner. These provisions undermine the ability of professional educators to 
determine what type of education is "appropriate" for handicapped stu-
dents (p. 359). 
Neal and Kirp find this approach ineffective. They claim the stat-
ute's egalitarian goal of securing for all handicapped children the right to 
an "appropriate" education is often frustrated because the meaning of 
appropriate education varies among and within school districts. Varia-
bility of school resources and handicapping conditions as well as differ-
ences among hearing examiners explain this result (p. 358). 
Also upsetting to Neal and Kirp is the possibility that granting spe-
cial rights to handicapped children may distort the allocation of limited 
district resources (p. 359). This problem is further "aggravated by the 
legal model which treats the parties to a dispute as discrete from the 
system in which they are located" (p. 359). 
Neal and Kirp also examine the costs of placing parent and school 
in conflict. In their view, "legalization betrays a mistrust of schools. It 
may inhibit the discretion of professionals whose judgment should be 
exercised creatively on behalf of the child [and not on convincing a court 
that their actions are appropriate]" (p. 359). 54 Moreover, an analysis of 
challenges to school board decisions reveals that middle and upper class 
parents are much more likely to utilize the appeal process. 55 Such par-
ents are better informed and, since they can afford to move their children 
to a private school, are more willing to risk antagonizing local school 
officials (p. 354). 
Neal and Kirp's concerns about disproportionate resource alloca-
tion and inappropriate interference with professional discretion form the 
basis for their recommendation that "modest change" be made to the 
1974 Act. Specifically, they urge earlier attention to developing 
problems, consideration of school board needs in determining what edu-
cation is appropriate, and use of alternative dispute resolution techniques 
(pp. 358-59). These recommendations are founded on their recognition 
53. Neal and Kirp suggest that the aspirations underlying such court-inspired statutory reform 
"include a desire for principled decisionmaking, minimization of arbitrariness, and a concern for the 
rights of the individual." Neal & Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The Case of Special 
Education, in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 343, 344. 
54. This point is also made in Berman, From Compliance to Learning: Implementing Legally-
Induced Reform, in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 46, 57. 
55. Legal challenges are also more likely in densely populated areas, because specialized legal 
talent and experts are more readily available in those areas. See Benveniste, Implementatiofl a11d 
Intervention Strategies: The Case of PL 94-142, in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 146, 157. 
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of both the rights of the handicapped "to enjoy essential public services 
and to participate in decisions affecting delivery of those services" (p. 
360) and the disequilibrium of resources created by "the enfranchisement 
of one group with little effort to relate that group's needs to those of 
other claimants" (p. 361). 
This approach is laudable because it recognizes the competing inter-
ests in this sensitive area. Moreover, Neal and Kirp's assessment of the 
costs of this program are directly related to proposed reforms that are 
sensitive to the values underlying this centralization initiative. Finally, in 
making their recommendations, the authors recognize that reform pro-
posals must be sensitive to the changing political climate. They note that 
the "rhetoric of rights has waned as calls for smaller government, lower 
taxes and budget cuts produce a climate skeptical of new claims on the 
public sector and doubtful about many of the old ones" (p. 360). 
B. Regulation and Legislation 
School Days, Rule Days also considers centralization that results 
from state and federal laws and regulations. Eugene Bardach's essay 
concerning paperwork, "Educational Paperwork" (pp. 124-44), is typi-
cal. Bardach, while recognizing that paperwork induces a degree of com-
pliance, (pp. 125-30), concludes that: 
[M]uch paperwork in the real world is bound to be useless or worse. In 
part this occurs for the same reason that all regulatory paperwork-and 
indeed, regulation-is bound to be excessive: it imposes standardized 
prescriptions on highly varied problems, and this necessarily produces a 
large number of cases in which regulatory structures are too burdensome 
or are inappropriate to the true situation (p. 131). 
These concerns are echoed in Robert Kagen's essay, "Regulating 
Business, Regulating Schools: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonable-
ness" (pp. 64-90). In addition to paperwork burdens, Kagen feels that 
much regulation is either a response to advocacy group pressure or an 
overreaction to "particularly dramatic" occurrences (p. 68). An example 
of such an occurrence, although not cited by Kagen, is the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education's conclusion that a "rising tide 
of mediocrity ... threatens our very future as a Nation and a people."56 
Kagen also emphasizes the need for reasonable sanctions to promote 
effectiveness (pp. 76-83). He is a critic of the current regulatory scheme, 
which requires the cutoff of funds to discriminatory school systems. He 
argues that because this remedy is so severe and because such actions 
"generate strong political pressures against federal officials" (p. 75), the 
56. NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE 
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983). 
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fund cutoff power is rarely invoked and hence ineffective (p. 75).57 
Kagen argues further that, even if a cutoffwere implemented, it would be 
counterproductive because it would further limit educational offerings 
for disadvantaged students (p. 75). 
Regulations may also prove ineffective if they are unreasonably bur-
densome. In "From Compliance to Learning: Implementing Legally-
Induced Reform" (pp. 46-62), Paul Berman considers the requirement 
that schools provide "equal educational opportunity" to students who 
speak limited English or none at all. Focusing on California, which has 
stricter standards than the federal government, he discusses the futility of 
efforts to implement a policy requiring school districts to offer bilingual 
classes whenever there are ten or more affected students at the same 
grade in the same school. Under this policy, Los Angeles was required to 
offer classes in Spanish, Armenian, Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, and 
Vietnamese (p. 51). More incredibly, under a state policy that requires 
individual learning plans for limited-English students, Los Angeles 
developed such plans for seventy-five non-English languages (p. 51). 
Compounded with the demands of such programs, Los Angeles faced the 
practical problems of a shortage of bilingual teachers and potential union 
opposition to replacing tenured teachers with new bilingual teachers. 58 
In the end, school districts often resort to unsavory tactics. For 
example, in order to meet a requirement that one-third of the students in 
bilingual classes be English speaking, some school districts place low-
achieving minority students in classes with limited-English students, an 
approach that harms both groups (p. 54). While such practices might 
constitute technical compliance with the regulation, the purpose or goals 
of the regulation might well be frustrated (p. 54). Berman's study there-
fore reveals that an unduly burdensome regulatory scheme may actually 
defeat the social good purportedly advanced by the regulations. 
Finally, regulation may harm the content of classroom learning 
through the more pervasive yet subtler danger of teacher dissatisfaction. 
In his essay "Teachers' Regulation of the Classroom" (pp. 109-23), 
William Muir, Jr. observes that "[r]egulations conceived in statehouses 
and courthouses are intended to affect what goes on in the classroom, but 
they presuppose teachers' continued control there. If external regula-
tions ... upset the authority of teachers on which order depends, then 
57. The threat of fund cutoff proved extremely effective in the disegregation of Southern 
schools, however. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. Kagen does not consider this 
matter. 
58. Aside from these practical problems, Berman notes that to teach a student in a foreign 
language, a teacher must be sufficiently familiar with that culture to effectively accomplish 
pedagogical objectives. Berman, supra note 54, at 51. 
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outside interference may lead to unhappy and unintended results" (p. 
109). 
For example, Muir notes that teacher control and effectiveness may 
be limited by due process requirements that teachers justify their actions 
and that students be provided with an opportunity to challenge teachers' 
claims (pp. 116-21). While Muir does not question the fairness concerns 
underlying such requirements, he emphasizes the need for courts, legisla-
tors, and bureaucracies to understand the "subtlety of authority" (p. 
122). Otherwise, the moral order that lies at the heart of effective teach-
ing is undercut. 
Each of the essays in School Days, Rule Days asks the same ques-
tion, namely, does the program at issue accomplish its objectives in a fair 
and efficient manner? While the explanations differ-the sanctions are 
too severe, the costs are too high, the allocation of resources is thrown 
askew, the judicial inquiry is too short-sighted-each author finds much 
that is wrong with the program under scrutiny. Through these criti-
cisms, the authors build a convincing case for reexamining various cen-
tralization techniques, and for insisting that legislators, administrators, 
and jurists think through the consequences of their reform efforts and 
constructively respond to failings in their programs. Moreover, on sev-
eral occasions the authors propose ways to strengthen the programs they 
examine. 
Despite their strengths, these essays fail to consider many matters 
germane to an understanding of centralization in education. Inadequate 
consideration is given to the impetus behind centralization efforts. With 
a few exceptions, 59 the authors fail to match the costs of the program 
against its objectives. Moreover, the authors generally do not consider 
the role that public opinion plays in the formulation of educational pol-
icy. School Days also falters by failing to acknowledge that some central-
ization programs accomplish their objective. In order to understand 
where to draw the line between appropriate and inappropriate regulation, 
attention must also be paid to success stories. 
These weaknesses in School Days are explored in Part Ill, which 
argnes that an understanding of the issues either ignored or given inade-
59. The book's Introduction considers this threshold issue, as do two of the essays: William 
Clune's assessment of the "New Federalism" in education and David Neal and David Kirp's study 
of special education programs. See Clune, The Deregulation Critique of the Federal Role in 
Education, in SCHOOL DAYS, supra note 10, at 187-208; Neal & Kirp, supra note 53, at 343-65. 
Kirp also remarks in his Introduction to SCHOOL DAYS that the policy question is not whether 
centralization "is perfect but whether [on balance] it represents a relative good." Kirp, supra note 
11, at 6. In discussing special education programs, Kirp and Neal make a similar point. Neal & 
Kirp, supra note 53, at 360-61. Clune, in his critique of the "New Federalism," emphasizes the 
necessity of recognizing that civil rights and other types of reforms can only be accomplished 
through some central authority, for they "require states and localities to do things that they do not 
want to do." Clune, supra, at 195. 
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quate treatment in the book is essential to an evaluation of the appropri-
ate reach of centralization. 
III 
CENTRALIZATION RECONSIDERED: A CRITIQUE OF 
SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 
School Days, Rule Days, although critical of centralization, does not 
question whether centralization is necessary to assure provision of cer-
tain essential social goods. In fact, since many of the authors suggest 
reforms in programs they examine, it seems likely that they support the 
values that underlie these programs. At the same time, most of the 
authors present an incomplete picture by not identifying these values and 
by failing to consider whether the program reflects the public consensus 
on where to draw the line between ensuring compliance with social 
norms and showing appropriate deference to schools and school systems. 
On a more general level, the book is also incomplete in that no essay 
seriously considers any instances where centralization proved effective. 
While such deficiencies do not eradicate the book's value, this study of 
the appropriate balance of power in educational policy would be signifi-
cantly improved if such matters received substantial treatment. 
This Part will argue that an exploration of these issues is essential to 
an understanding of centralization in education and ipso facto to an 
understanding of the appropriate reach of centralization. The discussion 
will be organized around three case studies. First, an analysis of varying 
teacher certification requirements reveals the relativistic nature of cen-
tralization requirements. Second, a discussion of the standards utilized 
in granting tax exemptions to private schools demonstrates that centrali-
zation requirements can reflect public opinion. Third, a review of federal 
school desegregation efforts points to the possible effectiveness of central-
ization measures, even under the standards utilized in School Days. 
A. Teacher Certification 
Teacher certification requirements are one mechanism by which the 
state seeks to guarantee that each child receives an adequate education. 
Under these requirements, teachers may be required to take "how to 
teach" courses in such subjects as public school curriculum, child devel-
opment, and classroom management. 60 Over the past twenty years, this 
requirement has become the subject of increasing litigation between 
Christian educators and state education officials.61 The controversy is 
60. For a description of state procedures governing the operation of nonpublic schools, see P. 
Kinder, The Regulation and Accreditation of Nonpublic Schools in the United States (1982) 
(unpublished dissertation available in the main library at the University of Missouri·Columbia). 
61. See generally Devins, State Regulation of Christian Schools, 10 J. LEGIS. 351 (1983) 
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significant for two reasons, both of which address the relativistic nature 
of the centralization requirements. First, courts are evenly divided on 
the propriety of this requirement.62 Second, states that have prevailed in 
court have subsequently abandoned this requirement for reasons of polit-
ical expediency. 63 
In court, Christian educators claim that the certification require-
ment bears no rational relationship to the quality of education, pointing 
out that their students perform at least as well on standardized achieve-
ment tests as do students in public schools. 64 In contrast, states argue 
that these tests are essential to a quality education for all youngsters.65 
Court responses to these arguments are not easily reconciled. A 
Nebraska court has held that the certification requirement is fair and 
reasonable, 66 while a Kentucky court has ruled that "[i]t cannot be said 
as an absolute that a [ noncertified] teacher ... will be unable to instruct 
children to become intelligent citizens."67 
Second, several states involved in such legal proceedings have modi-
fied their requirements in the face of the expressed willinguess of Chris-
tian educators to go to jail rather than abide by unfavorable court 
decisions. 68 In North Carolina and Nebraska, the state legislature, 
rather than compel enforcement of judgments against Christian schools, 
effectively deregulated all religious educational institutions.69 In Maine, 
the state did not appeal an adverse federal district court decision.70 
Finally, Kentucky and Ohio have failed to respond legislatively or 
administratively to the decisions of the state supreme court that invali-
dated teacher certification requirements. 71 
(examining conflicts between fundamentalist educators and the state and arguing that courts should 
require the state to introduce "clear and convincing proof" that its regulatory scheme is least 
restrictive means of effectuating a compelling state interest regarding education). 
62. Compare, e.g., State ex rel Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb.) 
(upholding teacher certification), appeal dismissed sub nom, Faith Baptist Church v. Nebraska, 454 
U.S. 803 (1981) with Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary and Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 
S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979) (invalidating application of textbook approval, teacher certifieation, and 
school accreditation requirements to Christian schools), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1986). See 
generally Carter & Devins, The State and the Christian Day School, in RELIGION AND THE STATE 
211-32 (J. Wood ed. 1985) (review of recent judicial opinions concerning teacher certification 
conflicts involving Christian schools). 
63. See Devins, Nebraska and the Future of State Regulation of Christian Schools, in 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, II 107 (D. Kelley ed. 1986). 
64. See id. at 354. 
65. See id. 
66. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d at 579. 
67. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d at 884. 
68. See Devins, Fundamentalist Schools vs The Regulations, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1983, at 28, 
col. 3. 
69. Devins, supra note 63, at 113-19. 
70. Id. at liS. 
71. Id. 
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The willingness of these states to concede purportedly necessary reg-
ulations, rather than close religious schools and jail religious people, 
illuminates the balancing test (social good versus social cost) inherent in 
centralization questions. In the case of teacher certification, professional-
ism concerns gave way to religious liberty and parental choice. In other 
instances, however, religious liberty and parental choice have given way. 
For example, the state enjoys wide support in its efforts to prevent reli-
gious-based denials of medical treatment to children.72 Thus, while 
administrative and judicial requirements might appear pervasive in edu-
cation, centralization is not an absolute. State lawmakers may eliminate 
teacher certification requirements. Likewise, courts, administrators, and 
legislators can and have dissolved other preexisting centralization 
schemes.73 
School Days, Rule Days, for the most part, does not explore the sig-
nificance of the tug and pull of values. For example, Doris Fine's study 
of San Francisco's failed desegregation effort does not consider whether 
racial equality concerns are sufficiently important to justify the lowered 
quality of education caused by community resistance. Had such an eval-
uation taken place, Fine-rather than just criticize-may have consid-
ered ways to account for community needs in school desegregation cases. 
Some essays in School Days do consider the underlying values of a 
centralization program. Indeed, Deborah Rhode's essay on class con-
flicts proposes ways to better recognize community interests. David Neal 
and David Kirp's study of special education is another example. The 
authors emphasize that "[t]hose who would undertake the legalization of 
a policy area must take careful account of the context into which the 
policy is introduced" (p. 361). Yet, these essays are the exception. Fur-
thermore, no essay undertakes a value-based analysis of centralization. 
As the teacher certification question demonstrates, such an analysis can 
be quite instructive. 
72. For example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Supreme Court upheld 
the state's right to compel immunization of its citizens. See generally Brown & Truitt, The Right of 
Minors to Medical Treatment, 28 DE PAULL. REv. 289 (1979) (argues that the law should allow 
minors greater self-determination in health matters). 
73. For example, parts of the Reagan administration's "New Federalism" have been enacted 
into law. Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, §§ 552-96, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3801-76 
(1982); see generally Devins & Stedman, supra note 3 (review of such "New Federalism" initiatives 
in education as replacement of categorical aid programs with block grants). Moreover, in addition 
to the teacher certification issue, state regulations governing home instruction have, on occasion, 
either been struck down or limited by the courts. See generally Devins, A Constitutional Right to 
Home Instruction, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 435 (1984) (argues that the state interests in assuring the 
economic self-sufficiency of youth and in maintaining the smooth functioning of the political system 
cannot justify a total prohibition on home instruction). 
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B. The Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools 
The evolution of standards governing the granting of tax exemptions 
to private schools indicates that centralization may well reflect public 
opinion. In 1983, the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United 
States 74 affirmed an IRS ruling that denied tax exemptions to racially 
discriminatory private schools. The ruling represented a compromise 
between two unpopular ideological extremes: (1) the Carter administra-
tion's 1978 proposal that tax-exempt private schools satisfy quota-like 
nondiscrimination enforcement standards, 75 and (2) the Reagan adminis-
tration's 1982 initiative to restore the tax-exempt status of admittedly 
discriminatory private schools. 76 
The failure of both the Carter and Reagan initiatives is significant, 
especially since the agency that administers the tax code, the IRS, is part 
of the executive branch. Under the Carter proposal, tax-exempt status 
would be denied to private schools that had a disproportionately low 
number of minority students.77 A public outcry followed this proposal, 
prompting Congress to delay implementation of this procedure by with-
holding appropriations for its formulation and enforcement. 78 Severe 
criticism and political embarrassment also greeted President Reagan's 
contention that all educational organizations-regardless of whether or 
not they discriminate-were statutorily entitled to tax-exempt status. 79 
The Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument in its widely 
applauded Bob Jones University decision. 80 
The Court in Bob Jones University, however, also steered clear of 
Carter administration efforts to impose statistical measures of discrimi-
nation. The Court explicitly limited its holding to private schools that 
actively employ racially discriminatory practices. 81 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court rejected the efforts of civil rights groups to impose judi-
cially the Carter proposal. In its 1984 decision in Allen v. Wright, 82 the 
Court held that civil rights plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge existing 
74. 461 u.s. 574 (1983). 
75. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). 
76. See 14 TAX NOTFS 150 (1982). 
77. The Carter administration's proposal would have denied tax-exempt status to private 
schools that either (1) had been held by a court or agency to be racially discriminatory, or (2) had an 
insignificant number of minority students and were formed or substantially expanded at or about the 
time of public school desegregation in the community. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296-97 (1978). 
78. See McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemptions for 
Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441, 459-61 (1984). 
79. /d. at 462-63. 
80. See generally Galvin & Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. U.S., 36 
VAND. L. REV. 1353 (1983) (arguing that Congress, rather than the courts or the IRS, should 
formulate national tax policy and resolve tax-exemption issues involving private schools). 
81. 461 U.S. at 595. 
82. 468 u.s. 737. 
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IRS standards. In fact, the Court's approach to the tax exemption issue 
demonstrates a desire to read public consensus into the Internal Revenue 
Code-a desire illustrated by its holding in Bob Jones University that "an 
institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not 
be contrary to established public policy."83 
This recognition of the public mood is not anomalous. In fact, 
much of federal educational policy appears idiosyncratic because it is 
more a reflection of popular opinion than pedagogy, federalism, or sepa-
ration of powers. Consider some recent examples. Although Congress 
failed to ratify proposed constitutional amendments to prohibit forced 
busing and permit school prayer, 84 federal desegregation assistance can-
not be used to defray busing costs, and school districts that forbid volun-
tary religious groups to meet on school premises risk losing all federal 
assistance. 85 While the Reagan administration speaks of a "New Feder-
alism" in education, 86 it is a principal supporter of the Excellence in 
Education movement, tuition tax credits, religious activity in the public 
schools, and antinarcotics legislation. 87 
For the most part, this state of affairs is not troublesome. Because 
education serves a public function, public values separating right from 
wrong should help shape policy (provided that our public conscience 
conforms to the Constitution). School Days, however, fails to consider 
seriously the role public attitudes and beliefs play in centralization. 
Instead, the authors scrutinize weaknesses in existing centralization pro-
grams. While this information is useful, it alone does not answer the 
question of how much centralization is appropriate. Such determinations 
must reflect the price that society is willing to pay to secure certain social 
goods or ensure compliance with certain social norms. 
In light of the many excellent criticisms of centralization in the 
book, it is unfortunate that the authors fail to examine whether the fail-
ures of these programs have in fact frustrated their underlying purposes. 
Concerns about cost effectiveness, resource allocation, and the adequacy 
of the judicial inquiry should not be viewed as criticism of a program's 
objectives. Yet, even in those essays that suggest reform, the authors gen-
erally do not explain that such reform might actually further the pro-
gram's goals. Consequently, many of the arguments against 
centralization could be made more persuasive simply by highlighting 
83. 461 U.S. at 586. 
84. See Migra, Congress Turns to Equal Access After Prayer Vote, Eouc. WEEK, Mar. 28, 1984, 
at 1. 
85. Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (Supp. III 1985). 
86. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 75 Cal. L. Rev. 781 1987
1987] REVIEW 781 
how the costs of these programs hinder the accomplishment of their 
goals. 
Two of the book's strongest essays bear this out. David Neal and 
David K.irp, in making reform proposals for special education, empha-
size that due process requirements may impede teacher effectiveness (pp. 
358-59). Paul Berman's essay on regulatory unreasonableness likewise 
emphasizes that regulation that is not sensitive to school resources will 
likely prove counterproductive. School Days would be strengthened by 
greater emphasis on this cotmection. The criticisms would then function 
as constructive suggestions to make centralization programs conform to 
public concerns. 
While heightened sensitivity to the role that public consensus plays 
in shaping educational policy would improve the book, an exploration of 
the role public opinion plays in this area, such as the private school tax-
exemption issue, should also have been included. This type of essay 
would serve as a useful reminder that centralization in education, like 
other policy initiatives, is ultimately accountable to popular attitudes and 
beliefs. 
C. Federal Desegregation Programs 
Another way School Days, Rule Days presents an incomplete picture 
of centralization is by failing to discuss centralization efforts that accom-
plish their objectives. 88 Although it may be true that many administra-
tive initiatives and court-ordered reforms create more problems than 
they solve, a study of centralization should include some discussion of 
instances where a program is effective, as well as an examination of why 
it works. Because a reader of School Days emerges with a clear idea of 
what centralization cannot do, I would like to balance that impression 
with a discussion of what it can do. Some centralization programs have 
led to meaningful change. Civil rights enforcement efforts of the mid-
1960's, as well as the enforcement of the Emergency School Aid Act of 
1972 (ESAA), 89 demonstrate the possible effectiveness of regulatory 
programs. 
One decade after Brown, Congress set the stage for federal enforce-
ment of the Brown mandate by enacting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.90 Title VI prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance 
from engaging in purposeful discrimination. In the field of education, 
88. For a discussion of what role an administrator's objectives should play in defining 
effectiveness, see Devins, Defining Effective Civil Rights Enforcement in Education, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1093 (1986). 
89. Title VII, Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 354-71, 
repealed by Education Amendments of 1978, Title VI, § 601(b)(2), 92 Stat. 2143, 2268. 
90. 42 u.s.c. § 2000d-2000d(4) (1964). 
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the task of enforcing Title VI fell to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department 
of Education).91 During the mid-1960's, the OCR-armed with the 
power to cut off federal education funds-was remarkably successful at 
combating racial discrimination in education.92 In 1965 alone, more 
actual desegregation of southern schools93 occurred than in the entire 
decade following Brown. 94 By the end of the 1960's, the efforts of the 
federal government had dramatically eroded southern school segrega-
tion. For example, between 1965 and 1968, the percentage of black chil-
dren confined to all-black schools in the South dropped from ninety-eight 
percent to twenty-five percent.95 
Federal funding of desegregation under ESAA also reveals that cen-
tralization programs can accomplish their objectives. In order to receive 
ESAA funds, school districts had to be implementing a plan requiring 
desegregation of children and faculty. Moreover, under OCR regula-
tions, ESAA assistance was limited to school district practices that did 
not have a disproportionate impact on minority students.96 School dis-
tricts found in violation of this requirement, however, could secure waiv-
ers if they agreed to take specific, remedial desegregation actions. One 
measure of the effectiveness of this process is that, between 1975 and 
1981, of the 731 districts declared ineligible by the OCR, 502 or sixty-
nine percent secured waivers.97 Another measure of the program's effec-
tiveness is its success in bringing about student reassignments. During a 
two-year period in the 1970's, ESAA resulted in the reassignment of 
approximately 244,000 school children from racially isolated classes.98 
David Tate!, former director of the OCR, characterized ESAA as 
"among the most effective ways of enforcing nondiscrimination provi-
sions oflaw and ensuring equal [educational] opportunities."99 
91. For a review of OCR Enforcement of Title VI, see Devins, supra note 88. 
92. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 3, at 1246. As Kirp writes, "During the mid-1960's, 
Congress, the executive branch, and the courts acted in concert, excercising extraordinarily effective 
leadership." Kirp, School Desegregation and the Limits of Legalism, 41 PUB. INTEREST 101, 101 
(Spring 1977). 
93. "Southern schools" refers to school systems which, prior to Brown, were officially 
segregated under so-called Jim Crow statutes. 
94. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 3, at 1246 n.6. 
95. G. 0RFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-80, at 5 
(1983). 
96. See Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979). 
97. J. Stedman, The Possible Impact of the Education Consolidation and Impro~·ement Act of 
1981 on Activities That Have Been Funded Under the Emergency School Aid Act, Cong. Res. Service 
(Jan. 11, 1982), reprinted in School Desegregation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Scss. 733, 746-47 (1982). 
98. Id. at 747-48. 
99. Id. at 749 (statement of David Tate!). ESAA, while accomplishing its administrator's 
objectives, was so unpopular that it was repealed in 1981 as part of the "New Federalism" in 
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The failure of School Days to discuss these programs adequately is 
remarkable and disturbing. Aside from their practical and symbolic 
import, these programs demonstrate that centralization can accomplish 
its objectives. Moreover, to assess the appropriateness of centralization, 
one must determine the characteristics of an effective program. Without 
that understanding, the appropriate balance of power in educational pol-
icy will be determined with blinders on, and the results might well be 
short-sighted and harmful. 
CONCLUSION 
Certain policy objectives can only be accomplished through coercive 
techniques. The determination of what policy objectives justify the use of 
such techniques is the harder question. While near-universal consensus 
exists on the evils of segregation and the inappropriateness of govern-
ment finance of discriminatory institutions, there is widespread and bitter 
disagreement on both structural matters (the appropriate federal role) 
and specific issues (busing, school prayer, student rights, and bilingual-
ism). Indeed, some of the most divisive issues in recent years arise from 
the implementation of the Brown mandate. 
School Days makes a valuable contribution toward an understanding 
of how to balance the competing interests. It does an excellent job of 
describing the defects of administrative and court-ordered reform. The 
book's case studies will prove helpful to lawmakers, administrators, and 
judges in their attempts to implement reform proposals or constitutional 
mandates. 
Kirp and Jensen's collection, however, focuses too narrowly on inef· 
ficiencies in various educational reform efforts. Although some of the 
authors suggest reforms in existing programs, insufficient guidance is 
provided for determining how much-if any-centralization is appropri-
ate. 100 Greater attention should be paid to the social purposes served by 
education. Congress simply was no longer willing to support a program that, through the use of 
statistical measures of discrimination, placed a stranglehold on school board eligibility. 
Public support for equal educational opportunity had not altogether waned, however. In 1983, 
Congress enacted the Magnet School Assistance Program, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4051-62, which emphasizes 
voluntary desegregation techniques and trust in local school systems. To be eligible for the program, 
a school district need not demonstrate that its policies result in actual desegregation. Conversation 
with Phil Kiko, Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (Sept. 3, 1986). Instead, by 
funding district-proposed specialized schools, the Magnet School Program is designed to attract 
applications from a representative cross-section of students. The shift from ESAA to the Magnet 
School Program reflects both public support of Brown and public opposition to coercive 
desegregation techniques. 
100. In his Introduction, Kirp writes that many of the essays recognize that "the present 
regulatory regime may be preferable to the politically likely alternatives, and that . . . reform is 
sounder than policy abdication at the national level." Kirp, supra note 11, at 13. SCHOOL DAYS, 
however, does not bear out this contention. 
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centralization, the role of public opinion, and the instances where cen-
tralization is effective. 
Aside from pointing to ways in which School Days could be 
improved, I have suggested in this Review that centralization conforms 
to some degree with popular opinion. 101 For example, the middle-
ground approach now utilized in the granting of federal tax-exempt sta-
tus to private schools may reflect public consensus on this issue. Private 
schools cannot engage in discrimination and receive federal assistance, 
and numerical measures of discrimination are inappropriate. I have also 
argued that, since education is a public function, it is appropriate that 
centralization be a reflection of public consensus. 
The centralization debate is likely to heat up in the next few years. 
The rapid accumulation of state regulation and legislation engendered by 
the Excellence in Education movement undoubtedly will provoke further 
controversy in this area. Whether the next generation of policymakers 
will avoid the pitfalls explicated in School Days remains to be seen. 
These individuals will be well served by a careful reading of this collec-
tion, for-whatever its faults-School Days is a valuable reference point 
for the shaping of policy in this area. 
101. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text. 
